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INTRODUCTION
Louisiana's treatment of punitive damages reflects the unique
hybrid of civil and common law traditions that exists in Louisiana
law. Unlike most pure common law jurisdictions, Louisiana-in
keeping with civilian traditions-refuses to allow punitive
damages except where authorized by statute. However, the
analytical framework employed by Louisiana courts in interpreting
exemplary awards that are allowed by statute closely follows the
traditional common law approach. The bedrock of this framework
is an extreme deference to the findings of the trier of fact both as to
when such damages should be awarded and in deciding,
"untethered to strict numerical multipliers,"' the amount of the
award. This amalgamation of approaches is the offspring of
Louisiana's mixed judicial system.
This paper briefly reviews the history and present status of
punitive damages law in Louisiana with a focus on the surviving
Civil Code articles that allow for punitive damages not tied to a
statutory cap.2 It will consider issues of application and
interpretation of these statutes and how these have been affected by
Louisiana's mixed civil and common law past.
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1. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620 (2008).
2. While these damages have no statutory cap, there are constitutional and
other restrictions, discussed infra Section II.A.6, placed on the amount of these
"uncapped" punitive damages statutes.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
I. HISTORY
A. Civil Law
Punitive or exemplary damages 3 have an exceedingly long
pedigree in code-based law across cultures. Often cited antecedents
of modem punitive damages law include the Code of Hammurabi
(4000 years old), Hittite laws (1400 B.C.), the Hebrew Covenant of
Mosaic law (1200 B.C.) and the Hindu Code of Mannu (200
B.C.). 4 The very foundation of ancient Roman civil law, the
Twelve Tables of 450 B.C., included punitive provisions, some
calling for up to quadruple damages. 5 More obscure codes of law
also included articles allowing for exemplary damages. Under the
Kanun (Code) of Leke Dukagjini, the written code of the honor
culture of the mountains of northern Albania, an individual who
entered the sacred space of another's home without leave to do so
was obligated to pay a fine in addition to double the cost of any
damage done or the value of any goods stolen in the home. 6
In contrast to ancient laws, the prevailing and longstanding rule
in modem civil law is that punitive damages violate the purpose
behind the law of damages, which is to "repair the harm sustained
by the victim of a wrong, and not to punish the wrongdoer." 7 With
this philosophical underpinning, "the civil law world has so far
been reluctant to open its doors to [punitive damage recovery],
instead remaining faithful to the traditional principle" that damages
should be compensatory in nature.
8
3. Most Louisiana statutes use the term "exemplary" rather than "punitive"
damages. The two terms are used interchangeably in Louisiana jurisprudence
although they have slightly different connotations. "Punitive" emphasizes the
goal of punishment. "Exemplary" emphasizes the goal of making an example of
the wrongdoer for purposes of education and deterrence. James E. Bolin, Jr.,
Enter Exemplary Damages, 32 LA. B.J. 216, 217 (1984).
4. David G. Owen, Strong Medicine or Poison Pill?: A Punitive Damages
Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 368 (1994).
5. Id.
6. SHTJEFRN GJE(Ov, THE CODE OF LEKE DUKAGJINI 60 (Leonard Fox
trans., 1989).
7. SAUL L1rvINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 7.6, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 205 (2d ed. 1999) (citing 7 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITEt PRATIQUE DE
DROIT CIVIL FRAN4 AIS 184 (2d ed. 1954)). See also 2 LINDA L. SCHLUETER &
KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 22.2 (5th ed. 2005); John Y.
Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 396-98 (2004).
8. L1TVINOFF, supra note 7, at 198. See also Helmut Koziol, Punitive
Damages-A European Perspective, 68 LA. L. REV. 741 (2008).
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This suspicion of punitive damages remains largely in place in
modem pure civil law jurisdictions.9 However, there are exceptions.
The codes of Brazil, Israel, Norway, the Philippines, and Poland
allow recovery of punitive damages of some kind.10 Serious
consideration is being given to a punitive law provision in the
French Civil Code. In September of 2005, a group of civil law
scholars, headed by project leader Pierre Catala at Universitd
Pantheon Assas Paris 2, submitted to the French Minister of Justice
what has been described as "one of the most ambitious and
comprehensive attempts to reform the French Civil Code in a field
where it has not been significantly modified in two hundred years of
existence"'11 -the law of obligations. Among the proposed changes
is a provision allowing punitive damages against a person 2guilty of
an intentional or deliberate fault with a view toward profit.'
B. Common Law
Punitive damages have been a fixture of the common law for
over 200 years. 13 One of the earliest known punitive provisions in
English law dates back to 1275 and stated that "[t]respassers
against religious persons, shall yield double damages.' From
1275 to 1753, the British Parliament passed an additional sixty-
four punitive articles calling for the availability of between one to
four times compensatory damages.'
5
Judicial recognition in English courts of the doctrine of
punitive damages came in 1763. In Wilkes v. Wood, an award "for
more than the injury received" was granted against the English
Secretary of State for an unlawful search of the plaintiff s papers. 16
In Huckle v. Money, the same judge upheld a jury's award of £300
despite the compensatory damages being valued at roughly £20,
stating, "If the jury had been confined by their oath to consider the
9. Koziol, supra note 8, at 748.
10. Gotanda, supra note 7, at 397.
11. Olivier Mordteau, France, in EUROPEAN TORT LAw 2005, at 270-80 (H.
Kozoil & Barbara Steininger eds., 2006).
12. Id. at 274. See also SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 7, § 22.2(A). To
date the proposal has not been codified.
13. Gotanda, supra note 7, at 397.
14. GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, THE LAW REFORM COMM'N,
CONSULTATION PAPER ON AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY
DAMAGES 18, n.9 (1998).
15. Owen, supra note 4, at 368.
16. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489,498 (K.B.).
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mere personal injury only, perhaps [20] would have been thought
sufficient.
17
In due course, the common law punitive damages doctrine was
carried over to the common law courts of the United States by
1784.18 During the nineteenth century, gunitive damages became a
widely accepted concept in America. A central feature of the
common law of damages was the jury's "broad discretion to award
damages as they saw fit."20 Under the common law approach, "in
cases where the amount of damages was uncertain[,] their
assessment was a matter so peculiarly within the province of the
jury that the Court should not alter it." 1
This broad discretion included whether to award punitive
damages and the amount of such award.22 Under the American
common law of torts (i.e., that developed through jurisprudence in
American Courts), "no particular procedures were deemed
necessary to circumscribe a jury's discretion regarding the award
of such damages, or their amount.' 23 Early common law decisions
made clear that a jury's award of punitive damages would not be
disturbed absent a finding that the award was so "outrageous" that
"all mankind at first blush must think so. ' 24 American common
law followed suit.2
5
C. Louisiana Law
Louisiana's Civil Code of 1808 did not include articles that
directly addressed or allowed punitive damages. Even some
provisions in traditional French law that contained elements of
exemplary damages (such as the partie civille, which allowed a
17. (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768-69 (K.B.). The language of the judge in the
Huckle case underscores what, apparently, remains a point of confusion in English
law: are such awards actually affirmatively punitive in nature or "merely a swollen
or aggravated allowance of compensatory damages permitted in cases of
outrageous behavior on the part of the defendant[?]" See LrrVINOFF, supra note 7,
at 200. See also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620 (2008)
(discussing the development of punitive damages in British common law).
18. At. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2566 (2009) (citing
Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 7 (1784)).
19. See Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2609; Townsend, 129 S. Ct. at 2566.
20. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. at 2566.
21. Id. (quoting Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340,
353 (1998)).
22. Id.
23. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 27 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
24. Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (K.B.).
25. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 422 (1994) (citing and
quoting Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, with favor.)
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criminal victim to bring a civil action simultaneously with, and in
the same court as the criminal action)26 did not carry over into
Louisiana's code.T7 Nonetheless, Louisiana courts soon began to
award punitive damages. As early as 1836,28 the Louisiana
Supreme Court approved a jury's award of "smart money., 29
Despite the lack of a specific statutory basis for such an award, at
least ten decisions rendered between 1836 and 1917 awarded or
recognized the availability of punitive damages under Louisiana
law. " However, some courts felt the need to demonstrate a
statutory justification for the award and turned to Louisiana Civil
Code article 1928 (now 2324.1), which states "in the assessment of
damages in cases of offenses, quasi-offenses, and quasi-contracts,
much discretion must be left to the judge or jury."31
In Black v. Carrollton Railroad Co., Judge Ogden's concurring
opinion claimed that Civil Code article 1928 provided "the
sanction of express legislation" for exemplary damages "which
[had] so long existed at common law." 32 He went on to quote
common and early American maritime law cases in praise of
punitive damages as a "true and salutary doctrine" 33 that issued
"proper punishment which belongs to ... lawless conduct."3 4 The
26. GEORGE W. STUMBERG, GUIDE TO THE LAW AND LITERATURE IN
FRANCE 168, 186 (1931).
27. Donald C. Massey & Martin A. Stem, Punitive Damages and the
Louisiana Constitution: Don't Leave Home Without It, 56 LA. L. REv. 743, 770
(1996).
28. An earlier case, Keene v. Lizardi, 8 La. 26 (La. 1835), acknowledged
that juries sometimes award "smart money" although it refused to reverse the
jury's failure to make such an award. It is unclear whether the decision was
based upon Louisiana or maritime law.
29. Punitive or "vindictive" damages are sometimes referred to as "smart
money." See, e.g., Dirmeyer v. O'Hern, 3 So. 132 (La. 1887) (vacated on other
grounds); Summers v. Baumgard, 9 La. 161, 162 (La. 1836).
30. Casper v. Prosdame, 14 So. 317 (La. 1894); McFee v. Vicksburg,
Shreveport & Pac. R.R. Co., 7 So. 720, 722-23 (La. 1890); Rutherford v.
Shreveport & Houston R.R. Co., 6 So. 644, 644 (La. 1889); Dirmeyer, 3 So. at
134; Hill v. New Orleans, Opelousas & Great W. R.R. Co., 11 La. Ann. 292,
294 (La. 1855); Varillat v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. Co., 10 La. Ann. 88
(La. 1855); Black v. Carrollton R.R. Co., 10 La. Ann. 33, 38 (La. 1855); Grant
v. McDonogh, 7 La. Ann. 447, 448 (La. 1852); McGary v. City of Lafayette, 4
La. Ann. 440, 440 (La. 1849); Summers, 9 La. at 162. See also Adams v. J.E.
Merit Constr., Inc., 712 So. 2d 88, 90-91 (La. 1998) (citing and discussing some
of those cases).
31. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1928 (1825) (now LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324.1 (2009)),
See McGary, 4 La. Ann. 440; Grant, 7 La. Ann. 447; Black, 10 La. Ann. 33.
32. Black, 10 La. Ann. at 39 (Ogden, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 39 (citing Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56, 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
(1808)).
34. Id. at 39 (quoting The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818)).
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opinion concluded that the doctrine was "too well-settled in
practice and... too valuable a principle to be called in question.
35
Justice Slidell issued a vigorous dissent. He disputed the idea
that punitive damages had any support in the Louisiana Civil Code
and specifically disagreed with the proposition that Civil Code
article 1928 authorized such an award. Turning to Civil Code
article 2294 (now article 2315), he argued that this article allowed
for reparation only, i.e., "a just and adequate compensation to the
plaintiff for the injury received by him from the defendant. It
suggests no idea of revenge or punishment." 37 He acknowledged
other instances in which courts allowed punitive damages but
termed these pronouncements "dicta" and "casual expressions.'5
38
Citing (en Fran9ais) French legal scholars Merlin, Toullier,
Duranton, and Domat, he stated: "My conclusion is that there is
nothing in the provisions of our Code or settled provisions of our
law which sanctions what are called punitory, vindictive, or
",39exemplary damages ....
The continued tension between Louisiana's civilian principles
and its adopted common law rule is well illustrated by the 1887
case of Dirmeyer v. O'Hem. In Dirmeyer, a lessee sued his lessor
for damages arising from the lessor's "rough and bulldozing"
efforts to execute a writ of provisional seizure, including putting
the lessee in fear of a physical attack with a bludgeon.4 0 Theury
awarded $500, a sum in excess of the compensatory damages.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, while expressing reluctance to
do so, nonetheless affirmed the punitive damages award. The court
acknowledged that "[t]here has been great confusion of ideas.., in
our own Reports ... respecting actual and exemplary or punitory
damages'A2 and conceded that the principle of punitive damages
was "borrowed from the common law, and, though tacitly and
sometimes expressly recognized in our decisions, it is really an
exotic in our system."43 "[W]ere the question an open one," the
35. Id. at 39.
36. Id. at 45.
37. Id. at 44.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Dirmeyer v. O'Hem, 3 So. 132, 133 (La. 1887).
41. The decision does delineate that part of the $500 award is punitive,
although the court states that "it cannot well be seen how they could have found
for a less sum consistently with the facts stated." Id. at 133. The court makes
clear that at least part of that award was a sum in addition to the compensatory
damages "imposed to punish the wrong-doer and by such punishment set an
example to deter others from the commission of a like offense." Id. at 134.
42. Id. at 134.
43. Id.
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court stated, "we would hesitate before recognizing this element of
exemplary punitory or vindictive damages, as existing in the civil
law.'" However, the court concluded that it was no longer an open
question since "in repeated decisions, [the court] has recognized
[exemplary damages] as actual damages .... ,,5
The tide turned in 1917 in the case of Vincent v. Morgan 's
Louisiana.46 Vincent involved a suit by the parents of a minor
child who was shot and killed by a railroad employee.47 The
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's award of
compensatory damages and its rejection of the plaintiffs' claim
for punitive damages, quoting with approval much of Justice
Slidell's dissent in Black.48 It concluded that a plaintiff's
recovery was limited to nothing more "in the way of damages
than adequate indemnity for the injury and loss inflicted upon
him ... in mind, body or estate . . . . 9 The court specifically
held that "pecuniary penalties imposed as exemplary, punitive, or
vindictive damages" were not recoverable.
50
Since then Louisiana's courts have consistently held that "there
is no authority in the law of Louisiana for allowing punitive
damages in any case, unless it be for some particular wrong for
which a statute expressly authorizes the imposition of some such
penalty."5' This position represents the current state of Louisiana
law. 2 Louisiana's rule purporting to require strict construction of
punitive damage statutes further reflects the civil law uneasiness
with this kind of award. 3
II. LouIsIANA's PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARTICLES
Even in the common law, which has long embraced punitive
damages, such damages have been highly controversial. From
early in this nation's legal history, views among scholars have
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 74 So. 541 (La. 1917).
47. Id. at 541-42.
48. See id. at 548.
49. Id. at 549.
50. Id.
51. McCoy v. Ark. Natural Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 385-86 (La. 1932), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932). See also, e.g., Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale,
518 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1988).
52. See, e.g., Killebrew v. Abbott Labs., 359 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1978). See
also FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW §
7.01 (2d ed. 2009).
53. See, e.g., Int'l Harvester Credit Corp., 518 So. 2d at 1041. This rule
requiring strict construction is often ignored.
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varied widely on the topic.54 The United States Supreme Court
recently noted that this controversy has continued into modem
times, stating, "American punitive damages have been the target of
audible criticism in recent decades, but the most recent studies tend
to undercut much of it."55 Louisiana's treatment of punitive
damages has in many ways followed that of common law states
both in terms of the political controversy and legal interpretation.
Louisiana has many statutes allowing civil penalties to be
awarded in a wide variety of circumstances. 56 However, the
Louisiana Legislature has passed only a handful of statutes
allowing for purely discretionary exemplary damages awards. Two
exemplary damages statutes were passed in the 1984 legislative
session: one allowing punitive damages for the wanton and
54. Owen, supra note 4, at 370.
55. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624 (2008) (citation
omitted).
56. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1973 (2009) (allows a penalty in an
amount not to exceed two times the damages sustained or $5,000, whichever is
greater, for breach of the insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22:1811 (2009) (allows for a penalty of eight percent interest on
the amount due under an insurance policy for accidental death claims if the
insurer does not pay the insured within sixty days of receipt of proof of death
and has no just cause for delay); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1821(A) (2009)
(allows a penalty of double the amount of health and accident benefits due under
an insurance policy plus attorneys' fees when the insurer does not pay within
thirty days and has no valid reason for delay); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:1821(B) (2009) (allows a penalty of six percent interest on the amount due
under a policy for accidental death when the insurer fails to pay with no just
cause within sixty days of receipt of proof of death); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:1409 (2003 & Supp. 2009) (allows a penalty of three times the actual damage
sustained plus attorneys' fees to be awarded to a person who suffers an
ascertainable loss of money or movable property as a result of the use of an
unfair or deceptive trade method, act, or practice, if the practice was knowingly
used); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3552 (2009) (allows an award of triple finance
charges plus attorneys' fees to be awarded for bad faith violations of consumer
credit transaction laws); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:137 (2003) (allows an award
of triple finance charges plus attorneys' fees for violation of monopoly laws);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1892(B)(1) (2009) (allows an award of the greater of
$1,000 or fifty percent damages on the amount found to be due on insurance
policies other than those for health and accident if failure is found to be
arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:1892(B)(4) (2009) (allows a reasonable penalty not to exceed ten percent of
reasonable expenses or $1,000, whichever is greater, to be granted to a third
person as a result of failure of the insurance company to pay reasonable
expenses incurred by the third person in connection with rental of a car due to
damage to the third person's personal vehicle); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:1892(C)(3) (2009) (allows a penalty of $200 or fifteen percent of the face
amount of a check, whichever is greater, if the insurer intentionally or
unreasonably delays the processing of a check issued for the settlement of an
insurance claim).
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reckless handling of toxic and hazardous substances57 and the other
based on the wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and
safety of others by an intoxicated driver.rln 1985, the legislature
authorized punitive damages awards against one who intercepts,
discloses, or uses wire or oral communications. 59 Then in 1993, the
legislature created a fourth statutory avenue to punitive damages,
when a defendant engages in criminal sexual conduct towards a
victim seventeen years old or younger. Finally, a bill authorizing
punitive damages awards against one illegally selling, distributing,
or marketing an illegal controlled substance was passed in 1997.
Of these statutes, Civil Code article 2315.3, permitting punitive
damages related to injuries arising from the defendant's wanton or
reckless handling of hazardous substances, was repealed in 1996
amidst great controversy. 62 The remaining statutes will be analyzed
separately with the greatest attention going to article 2315.4, the
existing punitive damages statute that has generated the most
litigation and appellate analysis and resolution.
A. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.4: Intoxicated Drivers
Art. 2315.4. Additional damages; intoxicated defendant
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary
damages may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on
which the action is based were caused by a wanton or
reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others by a
defendant whose intoxication while operating a motor
vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries. 63
1. The Purpose ofArticle 2315.4
Scholars have identified multiple functions served by punitive
damages: education, retribution, deterrence, compensation, and law
enforcement. 64 While punitive damages are usually thought of as
57. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.3, repealed by 1996 La. Acts. No. 2, § 1.
58. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2009).
59. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:1312 (2005 & Supp. 2009).
60. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.7 (2009).
61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.76 (2009).
62. One writer, examining in detail the Louisiana Legislature's repeal of
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3, concluded that "the several rationales
offered by the legislature were not well-served by the repeal and . . . the repeal
was more in response to industry political power than to doctrinal concerns with
punitive damages." STUMBERG, supra note 26, at 186.
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2009).
64. Owen, supra note 4, at 374-82.
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distinctly non-compensatory, the argument has been made that
"punitive damages do indeed serve a variety of important
compensatory roles[,]" including making the plaintiff whole for
items of damage not usually recoverable, such as attorneys' fees.65
The United States Supreme Court has focused on deterrence and
retribution.
66
The use of the word "exemplary" in Louisiana's article 2315.4
suggests that education is the main goal of the article. 67 However,
some Louisiana courts suggest that compensating the victims is
also an appropriate goal of the statute. In Lafauci v. Jenkins, the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held article 2315.4 has an
additional purpose, to "both penalize (and thus deter) drunk
drivers, and to provide damages for the victims of such drivers.
68
Similarly, in Sharp v. Daigre, the first circuit found that
compensating the victim was a goal of the statute, citing Black's
Law Dictionary, which lists, among other purposes served by
punitive damages, "to solace the plaintiff for mental anguish,
laceration of his feelings, shame, 69degradation, or other
aggravations of the original wrong ....
Most modern Louisiana courts, however, have agreed that
punishment and deterrence are the main goals of our punitive
damages provisions. In Mosing v. Domas, the Louisiana Supreme
Court articulated the purpose of punitive damages as embodied in
article 2315.4 as follows:
Such damages... are given to the plaintiff over and above
full compensation for his or her injuries for the purpose of
punishing the defendant, of teaching the defendant not to
do it again, and of deterring others from following the
defendant's example....
As described by the court, exemplary damages serve a
threefold purpose: punishment for the act itself, specific deterrence
for the individual being punished to prevent his or her engaging in
65. Id. at 378.
66. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 415-16
(2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
67. Bolin, supra note 3, at 217.
68. 844 So. 2d 19, 25 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003), writ denied, 842 So. 2d 403
(La. 2003). The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal was paraphrasing
Brumfield v. Guilmino, 633 So. 2d 903, 912 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994), writ
denied, 637 So. 2d 1056 (La. 1994). See also Aycock v. Jenkins Tile Co., 703
So. 2d 117 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 1997), writ denied, 709 So. 2d 753 (La. 1998).
69. 545 So. 2d 1063 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979)), writ granted, 550 So. 2d 640 (La. 1989).
70. Mosing v. Domas, 830 So. 2d 967, 978 (La. 2002) (citation omitted).
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the prohibited action in the future, and general deterrence from
such action for the citizenry as a whole.
2. Burden of Proof
The language of Civil Code article 2315.4 sets out the elements
of proof required in order to obtain a punitive damages award. As
explained by the court in Lafauci, the plaintiff is required to prove
three elements: 1) that the defendant was intoxicated or had
consumed a sufficient quantity of intoxicants to make him lose
normal control of his mental and physical faculties; 2) that the
intoxication was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries; and 3) that
the injuries were caused by the defendant's wanton and reckless
disregard for the rights and safety of others.
71
a. Intoxication
Article 2315.4 requires the plaintiff to show that "intoxication
... was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries. 72 As interpreted,
however, the plaintiff need not show that the defendant was legally
intoxicated; it is sufficient to show that the defendant's mental or
physical abilities have been impaired by the intoxicant. The
plaintiff is not required to produce scientific blood alcohol analysis
or other such hard evidence to prove that the defendant was
intoxicated within the purview of the article.73
In Drouant v. Jones, the trial court found the defendant was
intoxicated and that his conduct was willful and malicious. 74 The
primary evidence on this issue came from an eyewitness who
testified that she had observed the defendant swerve erratically and
cross over into oncoming traffic several times before finallk
entering the oncoming lane and striking the plaintiff's vehicle.
'
The witness testified that she believed the defendant was
intoxicated based on his behavior.76
71. Lafauci, 844 So. 2d at 25 (paraphrasing Minvielle v. Lewis, 610 So. 2d
942, 946 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 1992)). See also, e.g., Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d
998, 1003 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000).
72. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2009).
73. See, e.g., Drouant v. Jones, 834 So. 2d 518, 519 (La. App. 4th Cir.
2002), writ denied, 839 So. 2d 43 (La. 2003).
74. Id. The issues of intoxication and "willful and malicious" conduct were
relevant to the defendant-driver's related bankruptcy proceedings. The issue of
exemplary damages was not before the court. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id, at 519.
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At the accident scene, the witness suggested that the police
officer conduct a sobriety test, but the officer declined." The
police report contained no mention of alcohol, only that the
defendant was combative. 78 The hospital that treated the defendant
for injuries sustained in the collision (in the direct aftermath of the
wreck) also did not perform blood work to test for alcohol, nor was
intoxication mentioned in the defendant's hospital records. 79 A
blood test conducted the day after the accident was negative. 0 The
defendant denied drinking alcohol and attributed his behavior to a
diabetic blackout, but there was no medical evidence presented as
to whether he actually suffered from that condition. The trial
court found that "the evidence of [the defendant's] behavior [was]
one of intoxication and nothing else."8 2 In upholding the trial
court's findings, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held
that "even absent a positive alcohol test, a driver's intoxication can
be proven by the circumstances."
8 3
Similarly, in Levet v. Calais & Sons, Inc., the Louisiana Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeal upheld a jury award of exemplary
damages against a defendant who had "inexplicably" run a stop
sign and entered the oncoming lane of travel, thereby injuring the
plaintiff.84 The evidence presented at trial was that the defendant
and two adult friends had shared some eight beers prior to the
accident.85 The court found that this evidence, combined with the
defendant's actions, was sufficient to affirm the jury's finding that
the defendant was intoxicated and that the resulting impairment
had caused the accident. 86
It is clear that the plaintiff need not prove legal intoxication in
order to meet his burden. However, even when the plaintiff can
establish legal intoxication, such a finding does not automatically
satisfy the plaintiffs burden under Civil Code article 2315.4.
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 32:662, particular
results of a chemical analysis of a criminal defendant's blood give
77. Id. The investigating officer was deceased at the time of trial.
78. Id. at 519-20.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 520 (citations omitted).
84. 514 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 159.
86. Id. See also Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998, 1003 (La. App. 4th Cir.
2000); Owens v. Anderson, 631 So. 2d 1313, 1317-18 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994)
("Blood alcohol level is not the only way in which intoxication can be
established in a civil case. The triers of fact can look to the totality of the
circumstances .... ."), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1994).
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rise to certain presumptions for purposes of the defendant's
criminal trial.87 For instance, "[i]f the person had a blood alcohol
concentration at that time of 0.08 percent or more by weight, it
shall be presumed that the person was under the influence of
alcoholic beverages."88 The plaintiff in a civil proceeding, though,
"cannot avail himself of the statutory presumption of intoxication
that is allowed in a criminal proceeding."
89
b. Cause in Fact
In addition to proving intoxication, the plaintiff must also
prove that the intoxication was a cause in fact of the resulting
injuries in order to be awarded punitive damages. In McDaniel v.
DeJean, the defendant had 0.11% percent blood alcohol content
when tested after an accident and pled guilty to DWI charges
arising out of the wreck.90 Still, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court
of Appeal held that this strong evidence, "standing alone," was
insufficient to warrant an award of exemplary damages. 91 The
plaintiff must also prove that the intoxication was a cause in fact of
the accident in order to recover punitive damages. 92 In Myres v.
Nunsett, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal found that a
number of states have adopted policies making the operation of a
motor vehicle while intoxicated "in and of itself' sufficient to
warrant an award of exemplary damages in a civil case. 93 The court
emphasized, however, that article 2315.4 requires an additional
showing that the intoxication is the cause in fact of the accident
before exemplary damages may be awarded. 94 Although the
defendant had plead guilty to DWI and his intoxication was
established by other evidence, the court found that this played no
role in the defendant's failure to observe and avoid colliding with
the stopped vehicle in front of him.95 The court stated that "no
evidence was presented that indicates [the defendant's] drinking
87. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:662 (A)(1)(c) (2009).
88. Id. § 32:662.
89. McDaniel v. DeJean, 556 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990). See
also Brumfield v. Guilmino, 633 So. 2d 903, 910 n.3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
90. McDaniel, 556 So. 2d at 1338.
91. Id. at 1339.
92. Id. The plaintiff met his burden and the exemplary award of the trial
court was upheld.
93. 511 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (La. App. 2dCir. 1987).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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was a cause-in-fact of this accident" and thus denied exemplary
damages. 9
6
As is clear from the black letter of article 2315.4, a plaintiff
need only show that the intoxication was a cause of the plaintiff's
injuries and not necessarily the only cause. Louisiana courts have
confirmed this standard. Even where intoxication is only one of
several causes of an accident, the trier of fact may properly award
exemplary damages.
97
c. Wanton and Reckless Conduct
The final element of the plaintiff's burden of proof for
exemplary damages under article 2315.4 is that the plaintiff must
establish that his injuries were caused by the defendant's wanton
and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others. Courts
have not provided a precise or uniform definition of the phrase
"wanton and reckless," making the decision of a jury on this
question highly subjective.
For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Billiot v. B.P. Oil
Co. addressed the definition of "wanton and reckless" within the
context of another exemplary damages statute, the now repealed
article dealing with the reckless handling of hazardous
substances.98 The court held that:
In order to obtain an award of exemplary or punitive
damages, the plaintiff first must prove that the defendant's
conduct was wanton or reckless. In practice, this standard
obliges the plaintiff to prove at least that the defendant
proceeded in disregard of a high and excessive degree of
danger, either known to him or apparent to a reasonable
person in his position. In other words, the "wanton" or
"reckless" conduct that must be proved is highly
unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from
ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger
is apparent.99
On the other hand, the third circuit has phrased "wanton and
reckless" in this way:
96. Id. See also, e.g., Carey v. Thomas, 603 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1992); Clifton v. Collins, 563 So. 2d 408 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
97. See, e.g., Byous v. Ebanks, No. 2007-CA-1534, slip op. (La. App. 4th
Cir. May 28, 2008), writ denied, 992 So. 2d 992 (La. 2008); Hanson v. Benelli,
719 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
98. 645 So. 2d 604 (La. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Adams v. J.E.
Merit Constr. Inc., 712 So. 2d 88 (La. 1998).
99. Id. at 613 (citation omitted).
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To be considered wanton and reckless, typically, the
necessary level of conduct is somewhere between an intent
to do wrong and mere negligence. Actions knowingly taken
which would likely cause injury to another fall within this
category. Although no specific conduct by an actor is
necessary, a conscious indifference to consequences must be
shown. If the actor knows or should know that his actions
will cause harm and proceeds anyway, there is a conscious
indifference to consequences so that there is a wanton or
reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others.1
00
Because a plaintiff must first establish that the defendant
caused injury or damage while operating a vehicle while impaired
due to intoxication, the question arises as to whether this fact,
without more, is sufficient to meet the wanton and reckless prong
of the test. If so, this would effectively make the wanton and
reckless element superfluous.
That question is explored and addressed in the fourth circuit's
opinion in Bourgeois v. State Farm. The defendant in Bourgeois
collided with two unoccupied vehicles, causing property damage
but no physical injury.'01 After the collision, the defendant was
arrested for DWI and pled guilty. Her blood alcohol level was
measured at 0.227.102
The owners of the damaged cars sued her seeking
compensatory and exemplary damages.' 0 3 The trial court found
that article 2315.4 was inapplicable to property damage and that
there was insufficient evidence of wanton and reckless disregard
for the safety of others so as to satisfy the statutory
requirements.l'0 The fourth circuit reversed both of the trial court's
findings. 0 5 On the issue of "wanton and reckless" the court noted
that "several courts have, in dicta, indicated that a presumption of
recklessness can be made when the intoxication of the defendant is
the cause-in-fact of the accident."' 1 6 "[I]n most circuits," the court
continued, "only two issues must be proven since the intoxication
100. Leary v. State Farm, 978 So. 2d 1094, 1101 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2008),
writ denied, 983 So. 2d 900 (La. 2008).
101. 562 So. 2d 1177 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990), writ denied, 567 So. 2d 611
(La. 1990).
102. Id. at 1178.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1179.
105. Id. at 1184.
106. Id. at 1182 (citing Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Myres v. Nunsett, 511 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1987); Demarest v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 552 So. 2d 1329 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1989)).
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element and the 'wanton and reckless element' are proven by the
same facts."'
107
The court went on to review jurisprudence within the fourth
circuit that held evidence of a certain alcohol level was generally
insufficient to prove even simple negligence, much less to satisfy
the considerably higher burden required to show wanton and
reckless conduct.'0 8 It concluded that, at least in the fourth circuit,
intoxication and "wanton and reckless" remained distinct elements
of the plaintiff's burden that had to be satisfied separately.'
0 9
Because the case had been "tried on briefs," there was no real
description in the record of the details of the defendant's actions."
0
This was of no consequence, the court found, because article
2315.4 does not require proof of "wanton and reckless conduct,"
but, rather, it requires proof of "wanton and reckless disregard for
the rights and safety of others.""' A plaintiff is only required to
prove a "general state of mind" and a "conscious indifference to
consequences." 11
2
Although the court reiterated the "well established" principle
that the criminal presumption of intoxication tied to chemical test
results does not apply in civil cases, the court found that in certain
instances, if the level of intoxication was high enough, this fact
alone would allow the plaintiff to establish the conscious
indifference necessary to meet the plaintiffs burden. 13 Under the
facts shown, the court had "no trouble" concluding that a blood
alcohol level of 0.227 would put any driver into "the state of mind
sufficient to constitute 'wanton and reckless disregard"' so as to
satisfy the requirements of the statute. 114
The court concluded:
Under the circumstances of the instant case, the evidence
used to prove "wanton and reckless disregard for the rights
and safety of others" is essentially the same as that used to
prove intoxication. Nevertheless, the two elements are
distinctly different and should be treated as such; i.e., the
plaintiff must be required to prove both elements in order to
prove entitlement to exemplary damages under La. C.C. art.
2315.4. In some cases, different evidence will be necessary
107. Bourgeois, 562 So. 2d at 1182.
108. Id. at 1179-82.
109. Id. at 1182-83.
110. Id. at 1183.
111. Id. at 1183 (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. Id at 1183-84.
114. Id.
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to prove the two elements. Simple proof that a person was
driving under the influence of alcohol and that he might
have been impaired, by itself, will not always be sufficient
to establish the "wanton and reckless" element. The facts
and circumstances of each case-including, but not limited
to, the defendant's blood alcohol level, evidence of the
effect of the alcohol on the specific defendant, and the
consequences of the alcohol consumption-must be
considered in determining the necessary "wanton and
reckless" element. However, in this case, we believe that
the evidence that the defendant's blood alcohol level was
.227 is sufficient to prove the plaintiffs case.
115
Thus, there remains disagreement among the circuits on the
issue of whether a plaintiff may prove wanton and reckless
disregard merely by proving intoxication, and, where this is not
allowed, what additional proof is required to establish this element.
d While Operating a Motor Vehicle
Article 2315.4 requires that the intoxicated defendant must
have caused the injuries while operating a motor vehicle. The
plaintiff in Elder v. Rowe was a police officer who responded to a
call involving a disabled vehicle."16 When the officer arrived, the
car was on fire and the defendant driver was unconscious due to
extreme intoxication, rendering him unable to extricate himself
from his own automobile. 117 The plaintiff was in the process of
helping to pull the defendant out of the car when the car exploded
and the plaintiff was struck with flying debris. 1 8 The fourth circuit
denied the plaintiff's claim for exemplary damages because he did
not prove his injuries were caused by the defendant's "operation"
of the vehicle, i.e., a hazard created by the "unsafe movement or
placement" of the defendant's vehicle.' 9
However, at least one court has ruled that the defendant need
not be in the car for article 2315.4 to apply. In Duplechain v. Old
Hickory Casualty Insurance Co., the intoxicated defendant had
parked his still-running car in the travel lane of a road and exited to
argue with his wife while standing in the oncoming lane of
travel.' 2 0 The plaintiff was driving in that lane and came upon the
115. Id. at 1184 (emphasis added).
116. 653 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
117. Id. at 720.
118. Id. at 719-20.
119. Id. at 722.
120. 594 So. 2d 995, 997 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
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scene too quickly to stop, causing him to hit the defendant and his
vehicle. 12 1 The third circuit found that the defendant was
"operating" the vehicle within the meaning of the statute, thus
making punitive damages available. 122
Elder and Duplechain demonstrate that even the "operation of
a motor vehicle" element of article 2315.4 remains open to
interpretation. How that element will be applied in different
Louisiana circuit courts remains unclear.
3. Whether to Award Exemplary Damages
Article 2315.4 states that exemplary danafes may be awarded
if the required elements of proof are met. 12Whether to award
punitive damages is therefore left to the discretion of the trier of
fact. Louisiana courts have held that even when a plaintiff has
successfully proven all the elements entitling him to exemplary
damages, and thereby met his burden of proof, a jury may
nonetheless deny any award of exemplary damages. 124 The jury is
allowed to consider a very wide array of factors in making this
decision.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Mosing v. Domas discussed
factors that could be considered on this issue:
The factors that may be considered in deciding whether to
award punitive damages include: "[t]he amount necessary
to deter the defendant and others like him from engaging in
such conduct in the future, the wealth of the defendant, the
severity of the harm with which the plaintiff was
threatened, the compensatory damages awarded, the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the amount of
any other punitive damages awarded against the defendant
or with which the defendant is threatened, and any criminal
punishment the defendant has suffered or may suffer as a
121. Id.
122. Id. at 998.
123. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2009).
124. See, e.g., Brossett v. Howard, 998 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2008),
writ denied, 3 So. 3d 492 (La. 2009); Khaled v. Windham, 657 So. 2d 672, 677-
81 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), writ dismissed, 661 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1995). But see
Judge Plotkin's dissent in Boulmay v. Dubois, 593 So. 2d 769, 776 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1992) (Plotkin, J., dissenting), in which he argues that despite the use of the
"verb 'may' in the statute, the jurisprudence on this issue, when given its most
reasonable interpretation, mandates imposition of exemplary damages under the
circumstances for obvious public policy reasons."
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result of the same conduct as that upon which the plaintiff's
tort suit is based.'
25
In Brossett v. Howard, the defendant, who was highly
intoxicated, was driving home from her birthday party when she
swerved into an oncoming lane of travel and struck an
automobile. 126 The wreck left one of the occupants dead and the
other severely injured. At trial, the jury awarded compensatory
damages but declined to award punitive damages. 127
The third circuit recognized that the plaintiffs had met their
burden of proof so as to be eligible for exemplary damages, going
so far as to comment that if the jury had awarded exemplary
damages it would have confirmed such an award. 128 In upholding
the jury's decision, the court reviewed the evidence that the jury
could have taken into consideration in denying a punitive award,
which included:
1) the defendant's testimony that she was remorseful;
2) the fact that she had admitted fault both in the civil and
criminal proceedings against her;
3) her lack of prior negative driving and criminal history;
4) her clean driving and criminal records subsequent to the
accident in question;
5) that she had complied with restitution payments and
motivational speaking engagements ordered by the criminal
court;
6) testimony that her criminal conviction had hurt her
livelihood as a hospital employee because hospitals denied
privileges to felons;
7) her failed attempts prior to the accident to get a designated
driver for the evening;
8) her contention that once she recognized that she was drunk
that night, that she stopped drinking alcohol and began
drinking water; and
125. 830 So. 2d 967, 977-78 (La. 2002). In at least one case, the plaintiff's
conduct was found to be a permissible factor in the trier of fact's decision on an
exemplary award. In Aycock v. Jenkins Tile Co., 703 So. 2d 117 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1997), the plaintiff was the brother of a drunk driver defendant and
passenger in the defendant's car, who was injured in a crash caused by the
defendant. The appellate court, in upholding the trier of fact's decision to deny
an exemplary award, took note that the plaintiff had been drinking himself and
knew that his brother had been drinking and, therefore, was not a "totally
innocent victim." Id. at 124.
126. 998 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2008), writ denied, 3 So. 3d 492 (La.
2009).
127. Id. at 922-23.
128. Id. at 935.
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9) that she had supposedly asked her fellow part guests to
make sure that she got home safely afterwards.
12
The court added that evidence from categories seven through
nine "may have been considered by the jury as a self-awareness of
her impaired condition and attempts, although unsuccessful, to do
no harm."' 30 Interestingly, however, the court pointed to no
evidence about the defendant's actual conduct during, or
immediately before, the accident in question in its analysis of those
things the jury may have considered in reaching their decision not
to award punitive damages.
4. Amount of the Award
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Mosing also discussed
multiple factors to be used by the jury in deciding the amount of
the award. 13 1 The court emphasized that this decision is a "fact-
driven determination" and therefore in "the unique province of the
jury or trier of fact."'132 Thus, a jury must:
Consider not merely the act, but all of the circumstances
surrounding it, including the extent of harm or potential
harm caused by the defendant's misconduct, whether the
defendant acted in good faith, whether the misconduct was
an individual instance or part of a broader pattern, whether
the defendant behaved recklessly or maliciously, and even,
in appropriate circumstances, the wealth of the defendant. 1
33
The facts in Mosing provide a concrete example of evidence
elicited at trial and the application of the factors listed in Brossett. In
Mosing, the plaintiff's vehicle was violently struck by a drunk driver
who, at the time of the collision was fleeing from an earlier hit and
run accident that he had caused. 1 34 When the plaintiff's wife arrived
at the accident site, she reasonably believed her husband was dead
or seriously injured. 135 The defendant had a long and flagrant history
of drunken driving offenses.' 36 Several previous incidents showed
not only the defendant's recidivism but also his total lack of
remorse. 137 For example, after hitting the car of a past victim, the
129. Id. at 935.
130. Id.
131. Mosing v. Dumas, 830 So. 2d 967, 974 (La. 2002).
132. Id. at 974 (citation omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 970.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 982.
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defendant stopped just long enough to allow the victim to get out of
his automobile before the defendant quickly fled the scene,
"smirking at [the victim] as he passed him.'13 8
The court concluded that the defendant was "a shockingly
unrepentant recidivist drunk driver who has on more than one
occasion displayed a conscious disregard for human life and safety
while behind the wheel.... His wanton and reckless behavior...
could hardly have been more reprehensible." 139 While there was no
evidence introduced on the issue of the defendant's economic
situation, the court concluded "that lack of evidence does not
necessarily render the amount of the exemplary damages [of
$500,000] so speculative as to constitute an abuse of discretion
where the fact finder has other evidence to consider, such as the
nature of the tort.'
40
Mosing provides a roadmap through the appropriate analysis to
be applied by the trier of fact in determining the amount of an
exemplary damages award. The trier should certainly focus on the
act itself in that determination. Additionally, however, it should
also consider the circumstances surrounding the act, including
whether the act was part of a broader pattern of similarly
reprehensible conduct.
5. Appellate Review-State Standard
The Louisiana Supreme Court considered in Mosing whether
an exemplary award of $500,000 was excessive, especially in light
of the compensatory award totaling only $55,559, which included
loss of consortium and property damage. 14 1 The court recognized
that Louisiana's abuse of discretion standard of review was
"similar to the one that has evolved under the common law" where
"juries have possessed vast discretion to determine the amount of
exemplary damages."' 142 Indeed, the court noted that under this
standard, "[j]udicial interference with such awards has been
typically reserved for the 'glaring case... of outrageous damaes,'
one which 'all mankind at first blush' would find outrageous." r 3
On appeal, the defendant challenged the award as
unconstitutionally excessive in light of the line of United States
Supreme Court cases, including BMW of North America, Inc. v.
138. Id. at 980.
139. Id. at 981.
140. Id. at 979.
141. Id. at 971-72.
142. Id. at 972.
143. Id. (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 421-22 (1994)).
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Gore, which imposed federal due process limitations on punitive
damage awards. 144 In BMW, the Court promulgated three
"guideposts" to be used to determine whether an exemplary award
had "cross[ed] the constitutional line": "(1) the reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct; (2) the ratio between the exemplary
damage award and the harm the defendant's conduct caused, or
could have caused; and (3) the size of any civil or criminal
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct."',
45
The defendant in Mosing asked the Louisiana Supreme Court to
conduct a de novo review of the award in accordance with Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.146 However,
because the defendant had not made a federal due process challenge
of the award in the trial court, the court found that it was not
required to perform the de novo review but, rather, was "free to
review state law and common law excessiveness claims under an
abuse of discretion standard" as it had always done. 147
Significantly, although the court found that other state courts
had "embraced Cooper's de novo standard of review and [applied]
it to all claims of excessive exemplary damages," the Mosing court
"decline[d] the invitation to extend Cooper's de novo review
beyond its federal constitutional bounds.' 48 While the court
acknowledged that a jury's determination of the proper amount of
the exemplary damages award necessarily "involves a judgment or
policy choice . . . , the degree of punishment to be inflicted is
inextricably tied to the particular facts of each case, rendering the
determination a mixed question of law and fact entitled to
deference by the appellate court."'149 The court further explained
that the following factors have traditionally been used by
Louisiana appellate courts to determine the appropriateness of a
punitive damages award: 1) the nature and extent of the harm to
the plaintiff; 2) the wealth or financial situation of the defendant;
3) the character of the conduct involved; and 4) the extent to which
such conduct offends a sense of justice and propriety. 5° With the
exception of considering the wealth of the defendant, the court
found that BMW's three "guideposts". "mirror[ed]" Louisiana's
144. Interestingly, the defendant did not make a similar challenge on
Louisiana constitutional grounds. This issue is explored in Massey & Stem,
supra note 27.
145. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
146. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
147. Mosing, 830 So. 2d at 973.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 974.
150. Id. at 977.
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test, and so, while not bound to do so, it chose to utilize these
guideposts in its own review.
151
The actual wording of both the BMW and traditional Louisiana
factors suggests that "the conduct" of the defendant as used in
those tests clearly refers to the conduct of the defendant in
connection with the incident giving rise to the suit. However, when
applying the factors, the Louisiana Supreme Court, as well as the
third circuit, places the heaviest emphasis on the defendant's
history of similar conduct.' 52 In that regard, the court found the
defendant to have a "long history of alcohol related offenses
involving driving that evince a substantial disregard for the health
and safety of others."' 153 The defendant's conduct had "resulted in
serious physical, as opposed to purely economic, injury, and
pose[d] a clear threat to society at large."' 54 After a detailed review
of his driving record, the court held that his specific conduct in the
incident sued upon "could hardly have been more
reprehensible."' 55 As such, the jury's high award was justified in
terms of the first factor.
The Mosing court took note that in the United States Supreme
Court's analysis of the second BMW prong, the Court compared
the punitive damages award against the compensatory damages
award and was troubled by the 500 to 1 ratio. 56 However, the
Supreme Court cautioned against drawing a "mathematical bright
line.' ' 157 Based on this, the Mosing court found that a case
involving a low compensatory award may still warrant a high
exemplary award if a particularly egregious act was involved.
The nine-to-one ratio between the exemplary and compensatory
damages found in the Mosing award, stated the Louisiana Supreme
Court, represented "no 'shocking disparity."' 1 59
In Mosing, the court recognized that the letter of the second
BMW guidepost calls for a comparison of the amount of the
exemplary damages award not against the compensatory damages
award but, rather, against the "harm the defendant's conduct
151. Id. at 978.
152. In support, the court cites BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 579-80 (1996) (holding that a high probability of recidivism justifies a
higher than normal exemplary damages award).
153. Mosing, 830 So. 2d at 973.
154. Id. at 979.
155. Id. at 981.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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caused, or could have caused."'160 Thus, the court looked not only
at the physical harm actually done to the plaintiff (relatively little)
but also at the harm that could have resulted from the defendant's
conduct. As to the latter, the court noted that while the plaintiff did
not have a passenger in his car at the time of the accident, it was
the passenger's side that took the brunt of the impact. 16 1 The lack
of actually-realized damage did not "detract from the real and
substantial danger [the defendant's] outrageous conduct" could
have caused. 1
62
Referring again to the defendant's past conduct and the
apparent ineffectiveness of past criminal sanctions, the court found
the $500,000 award was further "reasonably calculated to punish
this defendant and deter such similar recidivist conduct in the
future."'163 The award was not so disproportionate that it
represented impermissible "passion and prejudice" on the jury's
part.1
64
The Mosing court then compared the exemplary damages
award to civil or criminal penalties that could have been
imposed. 165 The defendant was facing third offense DWI charges,
which carried a mandatory prison term of no less than one year and
a fine of no more than $2,000.166 While the fine was relatively low,
the court determined that the substantial mandatory term of
imprisonment was comparable in severity to a high exemplary
award. 16
7
There was a dearth of evidence as to the defendant driver's
financial condition, and he chose not to appear at the trial. 168 The
court nonetheless held that it is the defendant's burden to produce
evidence of his financial condition if he wished this factor to be
considered in the award of exemplary damages. 169 The court held
that, in any event, the defendant's financial condition was only one
factor, and there was ample evidence on the other factors to justify
the award. 170
160. Id. at 973 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at981.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 982.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 977-78.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. atn.11.
169. Id. at 979 (citing Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1203 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1982)).
170. Id.
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Based on all the foregoing and "with a view to the great
deference to be accorded to the trier of fact," the Mosing court
concluded that the $500,000 exemplary damages award was not an
abuse of the jury's discretion. 171 Mosing introduced BMW's three
guideposts into Louisiana's analysis of the excessiveness vel non
of a punitive damages award. Yet little of substance has changed.
The court retained the inquiry as to the wealth of the defendant
and, as noted by the court, the BMW guideposts "mirror"
Louisiana's traditional test. 1
72
In its opinion in Mosing, the Louisiana Supreme Court resisted
the invitation to impose an arbitrary mathematical ratio tying
punitive damages to the compensatory award. In applying
Louisiana's exemplary damages statute, the court paid homage, in
both word and deed, to the "vast discretion" given to juries in
making exemplary damages awards under common law. A nine-to-
one exemplary to compensatory ratio was not a "shocking
disparity" and was upheld. 173 Although not expressly stated, the
tenor of the court's language in Mosing certainly suggests that,
under the right circumstances, higher exemplary to compensatory
ratios would not run afoul of the court's excessiveness
standards.174 Practically, however, Louisiana courts seldom face
exemplary awards that would test the issue. To the contrary, the
punitive awards granted in Louisiana have tended to be similar or
lower than the compensatory damages awards. 175 For instance, in
Lafauci, the jury awarded roughly $48,000 in compensatory
damages and $22,500 in punitive damages. 176 The first circuit
described the award as "arguably generous" but upheld the award,
in part, because the exemplary damages were "much less than the
amount of compensatory damages awarded."'
177
The fourth circuit in Dekeyser v. Automotive Casualty
Insurance Co. was asked to review an exemplary award of
171. Id. at 983.
172. Id. at 978.
173. Id. at 981-83.
174. Such an award could put exemplary damages into the double-digit
disparity category that, under a de novo review for possible violation of federal
due process, would probably be deemed excessive. See State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (discussed infra).
175. This is consistent with the national experience where "by most accounts
the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards has remained less than
1:1." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624 (2008).
176. Lafauci v. Jenkins, 844 So. 2d 19, 23 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003).
177. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
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$850,000 when the jury had made a $500,000 compensatory
award.' 78 The jury's findings were upheld.
In Byous v. Ebanks, the fourth circuit considered an exemplary
award of $225,000 against a compensatory award of $450,000.
Finding it unreasonable-relying heavily on the added financial
inquiry factor-the court lowered the punitive award to $50,000.180
In contrast, a compensatory award of $1,625,181.90 and a punitive
award of $1,750,000.00 (roughly one-to-one) was granted by the
jury in Leary (discussed supra) and held not to be an abuse of
discretion. 18r
6. Appellate Review-Federal Due Process
How the Louisiana Supreme Court will ultimately handle a due
process challenge to an award rendered under article 2315.4 will
necessarily depend on how it applies cases such as BMW, s2
Cooper,183 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell (State Farm),184 and Philip Morris USA v. Williams.185
In State Farm, the United States Supreme Court found a ratio of
145 to 1 (exemplary to compensatory) constitutionally excessive
and added that although it was reluctant to assign that
mathematical bright line, "in practice, few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages will
satisfy due process."'186 Although an exemplary award may surpass
178. 706 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Champagne v.
Ward, 893 So. 2d 773 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2001).
179. Byous v. Ebanks, No. 2007-CA-1534, slip op. (La. App. 4th Cir. May
28, 2008).
180. Id. at 26. Despite there apparently being no federal due process
challenge at the trial court level, and admittedly reviewing the case under an
abuse of discretion standard, the fourth circuit's analysis is heavily reliant on
federal jurisprudence such as State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
181. Leary v. State Farm, 978 So. 2d 1094, 1096-97 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2008),
writ denied, 983 So. 2d 900 (La. 2008).
182. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
183. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
184. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
185. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
186. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 410. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the
Supreme Court created a maritime rule of punitive damages for marine
pollution, setting a one-to-one punitive to compensatory damages cap when the
conduct of the defendant was reckless but not malicious, was not driven by the
profit motive, and when the compensatory damages award was large. It remains
to be seen whether the same cap will be imposed when the circumstances are
different. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). In Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, the
Supreme Court held that punitive damages are available to a seaman whose
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that ratio and remain within the confines of due process, such an
award would probably be based on a particularly egregious act and
a small amount of economic damages. The Court added that:
The converse is also true, however. When compensatory
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only
equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost
limit of the due process guarantee. The precise award in
any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and
circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to
the plaintiff.1
8 7
In Phillip Morris USA, 188 the Supreme Court found that it was
a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to punish a defendant for harms to non-parties.
189
Thus, in deciding whether to make a punitive damages award, the
jury is precluded from considering the defendant's harm to non-
parties. However, in deciding the amount of the award, the jury is
allowed to consider the defendant's harm to others. As explained
by Frank Maraist and Thomas Galligan, "How a jury, or court can
meaningfully draw such fine lines is not apparent."'
' 9
By way of guidance to Louisiana trial courts, Maraist and
Galligan have written that, in order to avoid constitutional
challenges, those courts "should adequately and clearly instruct
juries as to the purposes and polices underlying punitive damages
and the factors that they may consider in deciding whether to
award punitive damages . . . . 191 Further, in light of the Phillip
Morris USA decision, "Louisiana courts should make sure that the
jury is instructed that it may not punish the defendant for harm to
non-parties. ,
192
employer has willfully withheld maintenance and cure. 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2575
(2009). The Court's pretermitted consideration of whether such damages should
be subject to a cap. Id. at 2574 n. 11.
187. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
188. The case has "ping ponged" between the United States Supreme Court
and the Oregon Supreme Court on a variety of issues. The most recent ruling of
the Oregon Supreme Court found that its decision to uphold the original award
was supported by a state law rule that could not be reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court. After initially granting writs to review the decision again,
the United States Supreme Court has now dismissed the writ as "improvidently
granted." See 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009).
189. Williams, 549 U.S. at 353-55.
190. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 52, § 7.03[2], at 7-34.
191. ld. at 7-35.
192. Id.
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One Louisiana court has had an opportunity to grapple with
these issues, although not in the application of article 2315.4.
Grefer v. Alpha Technical involved a $1 billion jury award made
under Louisiana's article 2315.3 (repealed), that allowed for
punitive damages resulting from reckless handling of hazardous
substances. 93 In Grefer, the plaintiffs sued Exxon Mobil
Corporation (Exxon), Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc. (ITCO),
and others for damages related to the radioactive contamination of
thirty-three acres of land belonging to the Greffers. 194 The land had
been leased to ITCO for cleaning, testing, and other handling of oil
field pipe that was used by Exxon and others. 195 After a five-week
trial, the jury found for the plaintiffs and awarded $56,145,000 in
compensatory damages and $1 billion in exemplary damages. 196 It
allocated eighty-five percent of the fault to Exxon, five percent to
ITCO, and ten percent to two absent defendants. 1
97
On appeal, the fourth circuit reduced the punitive damages
award to $112,290,000, an amount twice the amount of the
compensatory damages award. 198 The Louisiana Supreme Court
denied writs. 199 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the fourth circuit's decision, and remanded the
case for further consideration in light of the intervening case of
Philip Morris USA.200
On remand, the fourth circuit rejected Exxon's contention that
the United States Supreme Court's order mandated a new trial,
noting that Louisiana courts are constitutionally permitted to
review both fact and law.2° ' It reviewed its prior decision and
concluded that its initial holding was proper and that "Exxon [was]
afforded all of the constitutional protections available under the
Due Process Clause of the U. S. Constitution.
' 2 02
The court meticulously reviewed the instructions given to the
jury and noted that "for all intents and purposes, the trial court's
instructions tracked almost verbatim Exxon's proposed
instructions." 20 3 It concluded that the instructions properly
193. 965 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2007), writ denied, 967 So. 2d 523
(La. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2054 (2008).
194. Id. at 514.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 901 So. 2d 1117, 1152 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2005),
writ denied, 925 So. 2d 1248 (La. 2006).
199. Grefer v. Alpha Technical, 925 So. 2d 1248 (La. 2006).
200. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Grefer, 549 U.S. 1249 (2007).
201. LA. CONST. art. V, § 10(B); Grefer, 925 So. 2d at 526.
202. Id. at 518.
203. Id.
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distinguished between the evidence of Exxon's reckless conduct
toward non-parties and evidence of Exxon's reckless conduct
toward the parties.
The court recited its earlier conclusion that Exxon's conduct
"did involve an element of deceit" 2°4 and "satisfied the wanton and
reckless requirement, i.e., it was reprehensible." 20 5 The earlier
decision to significantly reduce the amount of the award was
reviewed and affirmed. The Grefer court described the move as a
"drastic... reduction based on the State Farm multiplier and the
compensatory award" 2
06
7. Vicarious Liability
The question of whether an employer of an intoxicated driver
may be assessed with exemplary damages under article 2315.4 is
not a settled one in Louisiana, and in this regard Louisiana law is
consistent with the conflict on this subject nationwide.20 7
At least one circuit has found that an employer can be assessed
with an exemplary damages award for the conduct of his
intoxicated employee who is in the course and scope of his
employment. In Curtis v. Rome, the fourth circuit reviewed a
summary judgment that precluded a claim for punitive damages
against an employer of an intoxicated tortfeasor because article
2315.4 "clearly intended that the driver and only the driver be
found liable for exemplary damages." 2
08
The court initially noted that there was "no case directly on
point addressing this issue., 20 9 Relying on Civil Code articles 13
and 2320, the court concluded that "those who are legally
responsible for the intoxicated driver may be assessed with
punitive damages under [article 2315.4]."'1 Subsequently, in
Lacoste v. Crochet, the fourth circuit confirmed its holding in
Curtis.2
11
The first circuit, however, has suggested in dicta that it would
reach a different result. The specific issue before the first circuit in
Darby v. Sentry Insurance Automobile Mutual Co. was evidentiary
204. Id. at 522.
205. Id. at 525.
206. Id. at 526.
207. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 52, § 7.03[1]; Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614-16 (2008).
208. 735 So. 2d 822, 824 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999), writ denied, 748 So. 2d
441 (La. 1999).
209. Id. at 825.
210. Id.
211. 751 So. 2d998, 1003 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000).
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in nature, but the broader issue considered was whether one
solidary obligor could be assessed punitive damages for the actions
of his co-solidary obligor.212 The first circuit refused such an
assessment. In a footnote, the Darby court mentioned that the trial
court had cited Curtis and Lacoste favorably and seemingly as
controlling precedent on the issue of exemplary awards against the
employers of intoxicated drivers.2 13 In something of a rebuke, the
first circuit stated flatly: "[H]owever, as this [c]ourt is not bound
by the decision of our colleagues on this issue and such a
conclusion may be contrary to the principle of strict construction of
punitive statutes, we leave that analysis for another day."214
8. Insurance Coverage
The question of when and to what extent typical automobile
liability and uninsured motorist policies may provide coverage for
exemplary damages is well-settled. Louisiana courts have held that
finding that insurance covers awards of punitive damages does not
violate public policy or the philosophical underpinnings of article
2315.4 when the language of the policy would otherwise provide
coverage.2
15
Such coverage does not violate public policy because whereas
exemplary damages are awarded in situations involving wanton
negligence, the conduct covered is negligence nonetheless.
21 6
Further:
[P]ermitting coverage does not automatically shift the
burden of payment. The insurance company can charge the
insured a premium for coverage of exemplary damages. To
the extent that such damages exceed the policy limits, there
is no shift in the payment of damages. Although the purpose
of punitive damages is to punish and deter, the injured party
receives the benefit of such payment and from the plaintiff's
212. 960 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007), writ denied, 953 So. 2d 59 (La.
2007).
213. Id. atn.1.
214. Id. at230n.1.
215. Sharp v. Daigre, 555 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1990); Falgout v. Wilson, 531
So. 2d 492 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ denied, 532 So. 2d 154 (La. 1988);
Louviere v. Byers, 526 So. 2d 1253 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988), writ denied, 528
So. 2d 153 (La. 1988); Beard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 534 So. 2d 52 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1988); Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1173 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1987).
216. See, e.g., Louviere, 526 So. 2d at 1253.
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standpoint, punitive damages are additional compensation
for the egregious conduct inflicted upon him.217
Other courts have found different paths to the same conclusion.
For instance, the fifth circuit in Gonzalez v. Casadaban found it
important that the legislature included no language whatsoever in
article 2315.4 to suggest that automotive insurance coverage
should not apply despite the fact that the lawmakers would have
been aware that drivers were required to have insurance, and those
policies generally provided coverage "against claims of any
character" except for intentional acts.218 The court found that
another reason such insurance did not violate public policy-and
should therefore apply if the language of the policy was broad
enough to include such coverage-was that "an insurance
company which accepts a premium for covering all liability for
damages should honor its obligation."
219
Louisiana courts have also concluded that it does not violate
the statutory purpose of article 2315.4 (i.e., to deter and punish) for
an insurance company, whose policy would otherwise cover such
damages, to be held responsible for the payment of an exemplary
award.22 6 The typical argument presented by insurers on this issue
was that if insurance companies were actually paying punitive
damages awards, the tortfeasor would not be deterred from, nor
punished for, his reckless actions. The courts' response has been
that the tortfeasor himself can, and ultimately will, bear the burden
of the punishment because his insurer has the right to proceed
against him in a subrogation action to collect any amount paid out
by it on his behalf.221 Such an action would not be without teeth
because an award of exemplary damages is non-dischargeable in
bankruptcy.
222
Despite the foregoing, Louisiana courts have repeatedly held
that, although it does not violate public policy or the statute's
217. Id. at 1257 (quoting Creech, 516 So. 2d at 1173). This justification is
based, in part, on the theory regarding the purposes of punitive damages still
cited by courts as outlined above (see, e.g., Lafauci v. Jenkins, 844 So. 2d 19
(La. App. 1st Cir. 2003)), in which some compensatory function remains an
aspect of the purpose. This theory is out of step with the most recent
proclamations of the Louisiana Supreme Court, e.g., Mosing v. Dumas, 830 So.
2d 967 (La. 2002), the United State Supreme Court, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008), and scholarship, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
448 (9th ed. 2009).
218. 556 So. 2d 1291, 1292 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
219. Id. at 1292.
220. See, e.g., Bauer v. White, 532 So. 2d 506, 508-09 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
221. See, e.g., Creech, 516 So. 2dat 1173.
222. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006).
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purpose for insurance policies to cover exemplary damages, it is
permissible for an insurer to exclude such coverage from its
policies.223 Additionally, if, under the language of its policy, the
insurer must provide coverage for exemplary damages, its
exposure is limited to the policy limits.
224
Whereas the intoxicated driver-defendant, and possibly his
insurer or insurers, may be taxed with exemplary damages, those
removed from the incident or injuries giving rise to the cause of
action are not subject to the assessment. The Louisiana Supreme
Court in Berg v. Zummo, in keeping with Louisiana's dram shop
liability position generally, found that the legislature, in passing
article 2315.4, had not intended to punish those that had provided
alcohol to the driver (e.g., the tavern owner).225
B. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.7: Criminal Sexual Activity
Article 2315.7. Liability for damages caused by criminal sexual
activity occurring during childhood:
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary
damages may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on
which the action is based were caused by a wanton and
reckless disregard for the rights and safety of the person
through criminal sexual activity which occurred when the
victim was seventeen years old or younger, regardless of
whether the defendant was prosecuted for his or her acts.
The provisions of this Article shall be applicable only to the
perpetrator of the criminal sexual activity.
2 26
On its face, the article requires that the following elements be
satisfied by the plaintiff for a favorable verdict: 1) an act of
criminal sexual activity (whether or not the perpetrator was
actually prosecuted); 2) directed toward a victim seventeen years
old or younger; and 3) shows wanton and reckless disregard for the
rights and safety of the victim.
Since its adoption in 1993, mention of the article in Louisiana
jurisprudence is almost entirely limited to its use as an example of
the limited circumstances under which a plaintiff may be awarded
punitive damages under Louisiana law. Only two appellate cases
223. See, e.g., Eaglin v. Champion Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 284, 288 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1990).
224. See, e.g., Pietsch v. Farmer, 957 So. 2d 315, 318 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2007),
writ denied, 964 So. 2d 338 (La. 2007).
225. 786 So. 2d 708 (La. 2001).
226. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.7 (2009).
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have actually dealt with the application of the article: S.K v.
Catholic Diocese of Baton Rouge and Capdeboscqu v. Francis.228
In Capdebosqu, the plaintiffs, two women who were minors at
the time of the alleged offense, sued the producers of a "Girls
Gone Wild" video after the producers took footage of the women
"flashing" a camera and then subsequently used the footage in one
of their videos. 22 9 At issue was plaintiffs' attempt to amend their
complaint to include, among other claims, an article 2315.7 claim
for punitive damages. 23 The court denied plaintiffs' motion on the
grounds that the proposed amendment did not sufficiently allege
the elements required for criminal sexual activity; thus, the claim
was bound to fail.23'
S.K involved a series of incidents in which one special
education student had inappropriate sexual contact with another
student during class. 232 The parents of the affected child brought
suit against the Catholic Diocese of Baton Rouge, which ran the
special education program.233 Among other items of damage the
plaintiffs requested punitive damages under article 2315.7. 214 In
denying the plaintiffs' claims, the court indicated that, although the
defendant had been negligent in its supervision of the children, the
conduct of the employees fell "significantly short of what is
normally described as wanton or reckless." 35 Interestingly, the
court failed to mention that, under the requirements of the statute,
the Diocese could not have been assessed with exemplary damages
because it was not the perpetrator of the criminal sexual activity.
Unlike article 2315.4, the perpetrator of the act, and only the
perpetrator of the act, is liable for exemplary damages under article
2315.7.236 Theories of vicarious liability and possible insurance
coverage are undone by the clear language of the article itself.
Another feature of article 2315.7 that stands out in contrast to
2315.4 is that, in addition to proving wanton and reckless conduct,
the plaintiff must prove conduct that is criminal in nature. Under
article 2315.4, the plaintiff need not show criminal intoxication,
but only that the amount of intoxicants consumed was enough to
227. No. 2007 CA 0742, slip op. (La. App. 1st Cir. Dec. 21, 2007).
228. No. 03-0556, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8989 (E.D. La. May 27, 2003).
229. Id. at *3.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. S.K, slip op. at 1.
233. Id. at 4.
234. Id. at 17.
235. Id. at 24.
236. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.7 (2009).
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materially alter the defendant's judgment.237 Under the plain
language of article 2315.7, however, wanton and reckless criminal
conduct is required in order to obtain judgment, even if no formal
prosecution has taken or will take place.
C. Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 15:1312: Interception,
Disclosure, or Use of Wire or Oral Communication
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 15:1312 was passed in 1985
as a part of the Louisiana Electronic Surveillance Act. Section
15:1303 makes it "unlawful" to "willfully" intercept or use any
electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral
communication under certain circumstances. 238 The violation of this
provision subjects the violator to a fine and/or imprisonment. 239
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 15:1312 states:
A. Any person whose wire or oral communication is
intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this Chapter
shall have a civil cause of action against any person who
intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person
to intercept, disclose, or use such communications, and be
entitled to recover from any such person:
(1) Actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages
computed at the rate of one hundred dollars a day for each
day of violation or one thousand dollars, whichever is
greater.
(2) A reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs
reasonably incurred.
(3) Punitive damages.
B. A good-faith reliance on a court order shall constitute a
complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought
under this Chapter.
Relatively little use has been made of this statute for the
purpose of pursuing a punitive damages award, and to date no
awards of punitive damages have been made pursuant to it.
D. Louisiana Revised Statute Section 9:2800.76: Sale,
Distribution, or Marketing of Illegal Controlled Substance
The Louisiana Drug Dealer Liability Act was passed in 1997
"to provide a civil remedy for damages to persons in a community
237. See supra Section II.A.2.a and accompanying discussion.
238. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:303(A)(1) (2005 & Supp. 2010).
239. Id. § 15:303(B).
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injured by an individual's use of illegal controlled substances. '" 2 40
Under this statute, certain plaintiffs may bring a civil action for
compensatory as well as exemplary damages against persons who
have distributed, or possessed with the intent to distribute, illegal
controlled substances.241 The action is available to several classes
of plaintiffs, including family members of a drug user, an
individual who is exposed to an illegal controlled substance in
utero, an employer of a user, a medical facility or other entity that
spends money on behalf of an individual user, and any person
"injured as a result of the willful, reckless, or negligent actions of
an individual user."242 All plaintiffs except drug users may recover
economic damages, general damages, reasonable attorneys' fees,
litigation costs, and exemplary damages.243
In order for a drug user to bring the action, a plaintiff must
disclose to narcotics enforcement authorities, not less than six
months before filing the action, all the information the plaintiff has
regarding his sources of illegal controlled substances. 244
Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot have used illegal controlled
substances within thirty days prior to filing the action nor can he
use such substances during the pendency of the action.Y5
Section 9:2800.76 deals specifically with exemplary damages:
In addition to general and special damages that may be
awarded under this Chapter, exemplary damages may be
awarded upon proof that the sale or distribution of any
illegal controlled substance or participation in the marketing
of an illegal controlled substance was in wanton or reckless
disregard for the rights, health, and safety of others. 246
There have been no reported cases utilizing this cause of action.
CONCLUSION
Despite the lack of any punitive damages provisions in
Louisiana's Civil Code of 1808, Louisiana courts routinely applied
the common law doctrine of punitive damages for over eighty
years. As they did so, however, the tension between applying this
common law doctrine in the face of Louisiana's civil law roots was
expressed in a variety of ways. One decision admitted to a
240. Id. § 9:2800.61(B) (2009).
241. Id. § 9:2800.63, .64, .76.
242. Id. § 9:2800.63(A).
243. Id. § 9:2800.63(D).
244. Id. § 9.2800.64(A)(1).
245. Id. § 9:2800.64(A).
246. Id. § 9:2800.76.
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"confusion of ideas" on the subject.247 Several courts attempted to
rely on statutes to support their approval of punitive damages
(specifically what is now article 2324.1), a misplaced reliance
since the statute made no mention of punitive damages. This
tension was also expressed in strong dissenting opinions.
Following the 1917 case of Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana,
Louisiana emphatically returned to the modem civil law view that
damages are meant to make reparation and to compensate the
victim and not to punish or make an example of the wrongdoer.
Thus, Louisiana law now permits exemplary damages only when
specifically authorized by statute.
Louisiana's experience with common law punitive damages
has not been forgotten, however. It has clearly played a role in the
interpretation and application of Louisiana's punitive damages
provisions, especially Civil Code article 2315.4. Lip service is
given to strict construction of these punitive damages statues, a
concept that arose from civilian uneasiness with exemplary
damages. In reality, however, statutes have not been strictly
construed. For instance, in the application of article 2315.4, key
terms such as "intoxication" and "wanton or reckless" have been
given broad, not narrow, readings.
Consistent with the common law approach, juries are given
"vast discretion" in considering a wide array of variables outside
the listed statutory factors in deciding whether punitive damages
should be awarded. Even when the plaintiff has met all the
statutory requirements for recovery of punitive damages, juries
have been allowed to consider these extra-statutory factors in
denying an award.
The same wide discretion is given to the trier of fact in
determining the amount of the punitive damages award. The
standard used by appellate courts in reviewing the jury's decision
mirrors that of traditional common law courts, and great deference
is given to the jury's decision.
In recent years, there have been dramatic developments in the
law of punitive damages on a federal constitutional level.
Louisiana seems prepared to resist changes to its own punitive
damages rules. Louisiana's law of punitive damages continues to
reflect both its civil and common law traditions.
247. Dirmeyer v. O'Hem, 3 So. 132, 134 (La. 1887).
248. 74 So. 541 (La. 1917).
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